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Abstracl
Distributing digiwl media contents to a large number of
users in a cost-effective manner is a challenging task for
the content provider. Traditionally, the content provider
either deploys a set of high capaciry servers or con-
tracts a content delivery network (CDN) to transport
contents to users. The first approach requires a signif-
icant investment to set up and administer the servers.
While in the second approach the CON charges the
provider for every megabyte served. For large fi les such
as movies, both approaches burden the budget of the
content provider. For instance, the limited deployabil-
ity of video on demand services may be attributed, in
part, to the cost factor.
Motivated by the success of the peer-lO-peer (P2P)
paradigm in the last few years and by the immense
number of the often underutilized end systems con·
nected to the Internet. we propose a collaborative P2P
infrastructure for cost-effective content distribution.
The objectives of this position paper are: (1) To high-
light the economic potential of a content distribution
system built on lOp of a P2P infrastructure, and (2) To
identify the key research problems that need to be ad-
dressed in order to realize this economic potential.
1 Introduction
Consider a content provider who is intereslcd in dis-
tributing digital media contents (e.g.. music files,
movies, documents) to a set of potenlial clients. Cur-
rently, lWO approaches are being used to distribute con-
tents to clients: direct and third-pany. In the direct
approach, the content provider deploys and manages a
set of servers with capacity commensurate to the ex-
pected demand from clients. To enhance performance
(in terms of, e.g., short delay and small loss ratio) a
third-party is involved to "deliver" contents to clients.
This third-party is known as a Contenr Delivery Net-
work (CDN). Content delivery networks, such as Aka-
mai and Digital Island, deploy thousands of servers at
the edge of the Internet. (Akamai deploys 10,000+
servers.) These servers (also called caches) are in-
stalled at many POPs (point of presence) of major ISPs
such as AT&T and Sprint. The idea is to keep the con-
tents close to the cI ients. and hence traffic traverses
fewer network hops. This reduces the load on the back-
bone networks and yields a better service. The CON
typically caches the contents at many servers and redi-
rects a client to lhe most suitable server. Proprietary
protocols are used to distribute contents over caches,
monitor the current traffic situation over the Internet,
and directs clients to caches. Cost-effectiveness is a
major concern in both of these approaches. especially
for distributing large files such as movies. For instance,
CDN charges the content provider for every megabyte
served. which might be acceptable for relatively small
files such we as web pages with some images.
We envision a collaborative content distribution in-
frastructure centered around the peer-to-peer (P2P)
paradigm. Instead of deploying powerful caches at
many locations, the P2P model relies on resource con-
tribution from peers (client machines). Every peer may
contribute a IiHle. but there is an enormous number of
them. The P2P approach strives to push the contents
even closer to the clients: contents are obtained from
fellow peers within the same network domain. The
collaborative P2P model can be used in two seuings.
First, it can server as a sllbsrrate through which content
providers disseminate contents to clients by employing
and aggregating resources from participating peers. In
this case, coment providers should motivate peers to
contribute resources to the system. Second, it can be
used as an infrastructure for a cooperative sharing of re-
sources and contents among peers. A cooperative file-
sharing syS(em is an example for the second case. In
this case, incentive mechanisms should be developed to
ensure fair contribution and consumption of resources
The collaborative P2P model has the potential to cre-
ate substantial value in a cost effective manner. com-
pared to a system where no such sharing occurs. How-
ever, realizing this pOlential is a challenging task. First,
how to optimally create and disseminate information
resources in a network among a large number of dis-
tributed participants with stochastic and dynamically
changing demand and supply is a hard enough prob-
lem, even for a central "system manager" with com-
plete information about the preferences and full con-
trol of actions of all panicipants. Second, this problem
is funher complicated by the fact that participants are
autonomous and self-interested economic agents (indi-
viduals or firms) whose own incentives and objectives
are typically not aligned with those of the overall sys-
tem. Furthermore, participants have private informa-
tion about their own preferences and other imponam
variables that impact the system behavior. Hence, the
success of collaborative information sharing requires
mechanisms that coordinate the actions of its partici-
pants such that they increase the value of the system.
Before we present the research problems, we de-
scribe the similarities and differences between the eco-
nomic issues in collaborative information systems and
transmission services in data networks.
1.1 Economics of Data Transmission versus
Collaborative Information Systems
The design and pricing of data transmission services
in networks emerged in the mid-1990s with the com-
mercialization of the Internet (see for example [2, 7.
ID. 12, 16, 17, 21]). It typically focuses on how to
design price-service mechanisms that optimally allo-
cate a capacity-constrained and therefore congestion-
prone network to given customer demands for lransmis-
sian services. Data transmission services share some
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of the economic characteristics of collaborative infor-
mation sharing: both involve the transmission of var-
ious media types with heterogeneous quality require-
ments over congestion-prone computer networks, con-
nect many independent, spatially dispersed and self-
interesled users who are sensitive to quality of service
and whose consumptions create externalities. Howcver,
it is imponant to emphasize that collaborative informa-
tion sharing poses some fundamentally new and differ-
ent challenges. (1) In data transmission pricing, users
arc typically only consumers of the resources. By con-
trast, in collaborative information sharing, the peers
are both consumers alld sJfpplier.~ of comelU alld re-
sources. (2) Even though the Internet is managed by
independent service providers, its supply infrastructure
is nevertheless much more aggregated than is the case
in collaborative infonnation sharing where each panic-
ipant who supplies system resources is an independent
agent. In this sense, PZP systems are "completely de·
centralized"; their available infrastructure and the loca-
tion and quantity of the information they carry are sub-
ject to the decisions of a much larger number ofsmaller
entities than in data transmission systems. (3) The
work on data transmission pricing focuses on the pro-
visioning and allocation of a givell set of resources LO
a given set of demand functions for data transmissions
between a given source and destination. By contrast, in
collaborative information sharing, the set of available
resources and their capacities are fUflctions of peers'
decisions, the demands for transmissions arefimctiolls
of how much content is made available for sharing. and
the source-destination(s) pairs are filllctiolls of peers'
sharing choices, network locations and the mechanism
for matching supplying peer(s) LO client peers.
2 Research Problems
The goal of our research is to desigll alld test economic
mechallisms that yield highly perfonnillg collaborative
illfanllatiall sharillg systems: they should be at least
economically viable, and ideally economically attrac-
tive. for all participants. To that end, we need to de-
velop a systematic understanding of how system behav-
ior depends on (1) the technological properties of the
system, (2) the incentives of the economic agents that
control their resources, and (3) the mechanisms that are
in place. Specifically, the following research problems
need to be resolved in order to realize the collaborative
model for content distribution.
2.1 Defining Economic Performance Objec-
tives
First of all, the economic performance objectives of the
collaborative system have to be clearly defined. These
may include: (I) maximize the .rystem benefit, or aggrc·
gate utility minus cost. This aggregate metric typically
rcsults from more specific objectives, including, (2)
large variety (selection) and high recency of available
information content, (3) high qualiry of service deliv-
ery, (4) high consumption (sharing) levels of available
information, and (5) low incremental cost of deploying
the sharing infrastrucrure. In addilion, it may be im·
portant to evaluate the di.\·lribll/ioll of bellefits among
client peers, supplying pecrs, and other relevant partic-
ipant groups.
2.2 Mechanism Design for Information Net-
work Provisioning
We define network provisioning as the process of creat-
ing and distributing information resources among sup-
plier peers in preparation for client requests. This defi-
nition bears some similarities with the replication prob-
lem addressed by Choen and Shenker [6]. The authors
propose optimal replication strategies that minimizes
the expected search size in an unstructured P2P envi-
ronment. They prove that replicating objects in pro-
portion to the square·root of their query rates yields
the minimum expected search sizc for locatable items.
However, lhe replication strategies assume "full co·
operation" from peers, in the sensc that a peer vol-
untarily commits some of its capacity to the system
and follows the prescribed protocol for replicating ob·
jects. Peers of this nature fall in the obedient nodes
category in the classification given by Shneidman and
Parkes [20] and Feigenbaum and Shenker [9]. The obe-
dienl nodes along with faulty nodes-those that may
stop working (fail stop), drop messages, or act arbi-
trarily (Byzamine)-are the rypical nodes used in the
distributed systems literature. In contrast, nodes in
P2P systems are found to be economically rarional or
utility-maximizing agents [20, 9]. Unless properly in·
centivised, nodes may deviate from the prOlocol or not
participate at all. In the replication problem, if peers
are not paid for sharing data, they may not have an in-
centive to cache data for subsequent sharing. If they do
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get paid, their decision to cache may depend on more
sublle factors such as their "forecast of demand" for
the cached materials. In a multi-product environment,
a peer may prefer to only cache whal she perceives to
be lhe most popular and therefore the most lucrative
content, even though this may not be in line with the
overall system objective.
This makes the provisioning problem more challeng-
ing because we need 10: (I) understand pecrs behav-
ior and more specifically their valuation of their own
capaciry, (2) study how (hc system performance de-
pends not only on the aggregate capacity but also on the
heterogenous contributions from individual peers, (3)
analyze the interaction between the provisioning and
matching algorithms, and (4) design an incentive mech·
anism to integrate the above issues into a provisioning
algorithm that optimizes a system-wide objective func-
lion.
The fact that agents are distributed and have a con-
siderable amount of privale information also raises the
question of how centralizcd the mechanism should be.
Adding (he critical computational tractability issue, the
problem becomes a distributed algorithmic mechanism
design (DAMD), whereby the agents, the relevant in-
formation, and the computation of the mechanism are
distributed. Examples of DAMD in the data transmis-
sion setting include [8] and [9].
2.3 Mechanism Design for Matching Client
and Supplier Peers
The problem of matching client requests with supplier
peers can be viewed as a complex routing problem. Un-
like in standard routing, here the destination is [0 be en-
dogenously determined as a function of the incentives
of clients (e.g., price, content and service quality), sup-
pliers (e.g., current vs. fulure revenue opportunity, re-
source consumption of fulfilling request) and those of
the overall system (e.g., value of request vs. negalive
externalities on service quality of competing requeslS).
2.4 Mechanism Design for Joint Provisioning
And Matching
The next task is to study how the provisioning and
matching mechanisms interact and 10 search for mech-
anism pairs that perform well together. This search
will give special consideration to mechanisms that link
a peer's case of access to others' resources to her will-
ingness to share her own.
be used to categorize the market and network environ-
ment.
2.5 Study of P2P System Macro Structure and
Behavior
Related Work
The economic aspects of peer"to-peer systems have re-
ccived litlle attention so far. Previous research ap-
pears to mainly focus on the free riding problem,
whereby only a small fraction of peers contribme re-
sources into the system. Free-riding has been shown by
[1] (through a measurement srudy) and [II] (through
game-theoretic analysis). Using a model of user be-
havior and empirical data collected from OpenNap net-
works, [3] shows that free-riding increases with the size
of the P2P network. a known phenomenon in the pub-
lic goods setting [13. 19]. Free riding threatens the fu-
ture of P2P systems by stifling the growth of the sys-
tem capacity and the variety and volume of sharing.
Researchers of [II] and [I] advocate the use of pay-
ment mechanisms that motivate the peers with incen-
tives to contribute to the system. In [111, the authors
construct a game theoretic model of P2P systems and
srudy user equilibria under different paymem mecha-
nisms thal the system offers the peers, such as micro-
payments, points-based. and rewards for sharing. By
contrast, [IS] focuses not on peers' incentives but on
those of the central authority in file-sharing services
such as Napster that are centrally managed. They pro-
pose how peers should pay the central entity to motivate
it to make clients aware of their content. To prevent the
problem of content piracy, [14] proposes a system ar-
chitecture that uses economic incentives instead of tam-
per resistance protocols and motivates users to keep the
content within the subscription community.
In summary, existing economic studies of P2P sys-
tems give partial, mostly qualitative, insights into some
of the incentives that drive peers' behavior in collabo-
rative information sharing. and they explore some par-
tial solllfio//s. However, since they abstract away im-
portant lechnological features of the network environ-
ment within which peers operate, these studies are not
equipped to provide a systematic understanding of how
a P2P system behaves depending on the technical and
economic mechanisms that govern its operation.
Comparison of P2P Systems with Key Al-
ternatives
The provisioning and matching mechanisms arc likely 3
to impact how a network forms and behaves. This
raises interesting fundamenral questions about the rela-
tionship between the macro behavior of the system and
the behavior of its individual components. From this
perspective, collaborative information sharing systems
can be viewed as complex systems [I8], whose study is
creating significant interest in various branches of the
physical and social sciences. A number of interesting
open questions can be asked about the macro structure
and function ofP2P systems that emerge in such decen-
tralized fashion: How do they compare to those that are
obtained by centralized design? What can be said about
their dynamics? Do they converge to certain structural
and functional patterns? If so, how stable are these pat-
terns and how "organized" do they appear to be? These
questions may well uncover interesting links between
the structure of collaborative information sharing sys-
tems and their economics: for example. how concen-
trated are the peers and is the content in a system that
has reached steady-state? Does the resulting structure
of supply and demand reflect a high degree of market
power for a small number of large peers, or do all peers
control a comparable amount of resources? How do the
answers depend on the mechanism design and on key
features of the participants?
2.6
The objective of this task is to systematically compare
the economic and operational perfonnance ofP2P sys-
tems with those of key alternatives, including content
distribution networks. A comparison framework that
identifies key economic and operational perfonnance
metrics as well as metrics that categorize the market
and network environment need to developed. The eco-
nomic and operational performance metrics may in-
clude: expected provider profits. cost effectiveness,
customer benefits, system stability, and service quality.
While the geographical dispersion of potential users,
concentration of capacity bottlenecks in the delivery
infrastructure, and naLUre of data to be distributed can
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4 Conclusion
In this position paper, we introduced the idea of a col-
laborative infrastructure for content distribution, which
relics on aggregating resource comrihutions from the
participants in the system. We argued that the collabo-
rative model has the pmcmial to create substantial value
in a cost-effective manner. We also presented the re-
search challenges facing (he model. These challenges
mainly include designing incentive-compatible algo-
rithms for: replicating infonnation resources among
suppliers, matching clients with the appropriate suppli-
ers, and the interaction between the replication and the
matching. They also include characterizing the macro
structure behavior of the collaborative model and com-
paring it versus its alternatives.
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